Abstract. In this paper, we propose a new certificateless identification scheme based on isogenies between elliptic curves that is a candidate for quantum-resistant problems. The proposed scheme has the batch verification property which allows verifying more than one identity by executing only a single challenge-response protocol.
Introduction
In 1978, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [13] proposed the first public-key encryption scheme that allows an entity to securely send a message to another entity without sharing any secret key between two parties. The fundamental point of public-key encryption is generating a pair of keys instead of just one, a public key for encryption and a related private key for decryption.
Despite its many benefits, history has shown that public key encryption faces a significant practical problem: the sender has to be sure that the used public key is indeed the intended receiver's public key. Therefore, the presence of a trusted third party who can be relied upon to check a receiver's identity and guarantee the accuracy of the public key seems to be necessary.
Hence the user has to bind his public key to his identity using a certificate obtained from a certificate authority. Nevertheless, this method leads to the certificate management problem as the number of users increases.
The same problem occurs in identification schemes in which a prover tries to confirm his identity such that an intruder watching the information flow, cannot easily impersonate the prover's identity. In 1984, Shamir proposed the idea of identity-based cryptography to deal away with the problem of certificate management [14] . However, the first identity-based identification schemes were proposed by Bellare et al. [2] and Kurosawa [12] in 2004 independently.
In these schemes, Bellare and Kurosawa replaced the public key infrastructure with a trusted authority to compute the private key for the users. This method seemed to be more efficient than the certificate-based scheme, but the disadvantage was that the trusted authority who had created the private key pairs had access to the user's private key in the system.
In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson introduced the notion of certificateless public key cryptography, that escaped the weakness of identity-based cryptography despite maintaining its attractive properties [1] . In this scheme, the idea is that the trusted third party called the Key Generation Center (KGC) generates a partial private key for each user. Then the user combines the private key with its own selected secret value to create his full private key. Therefore, the key generation center doesn't have access to the user's full private key. After presenting this approach, many certificateless encryption and identification schemes have appeared with many security assumptions in literature. Using the user-selected secret value in certificateless public key cryptography, not only removes the inherited key escrow property from the identitybased public key cryptosystem but also makes the user free from obtaining a certificate from the trusted authority to establish the authenticity of his public key.
In 2013, Chin et al. proposed the first model of certificateless identification scheme (CLI) in [5] which offered an alternative solution to the certificate management problem of traditional identification schemes. The security of many of the current identification schemes are based on the hardness of discrete logarithm problem. Since the appearance of quantum computers in the future may cause a serious threat to the security of these protocols, post-quantum cryptography searches to design cryptosystems that are secure against both quantum and classical computers simultaneously. Some of these quantum-resistant cryptosystems are lattice-based cryptosystems, code-based cryptosystems, McEliece cryptosystem and multivariate public key cryptography.
Isogeny-based cryptosystems seem to be a promising candidate for quantum-resistant cryptography. In 2011, Luca de Feo et al. proposed a new quantum-resistant zero-knowledge identification scheme using isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves and detailed security proofs for the protocols [9] . In this paper, we propose a new certificateless identification scheme using isogenies between elliptic curves. This scheme is a challenge-response identification protocol using pairings on elliptic curves. Moreover, it has the batch verification property which means that by a single execution of the protocol, the verifier can check more than one identity at the same time. Developing a sub-exponential time quantum algorithm to break isogenies between ordinary elliptic curves by Childs et al. [4] motivates us to use supersingular elliptic curves for which the fastest known quantum attack remains exponential because of the non-commutativity of the endomorphism ring.
In this paper, we first briefly review the concept of elliptic curves, isogenies and some useful properties of these maps in section 2. In section 3, we present a certificateless identification scheme first proposed by Chin et al. [6] . Then we continue with constructing a certificateless identification scheme on the additive group of elliptic curves inspired by Chin et al. [6] scheme on multiplicative groups. In section 4, we present our certificateless identification scheme using isogenies between elliptic curves. This protocol can be applied specially on supersingular elliptic curves to increase the security against quantum attacks due to the existence of a subexponential attack for the isogeny problem for ordinary elliptic curves. Moreover, the proposed scheme has the batch verification property and can be used to verify more than one identity by executing a single challenge-response protocol.
Preliminaries
Elliptic Curves and Isogenies: In this section, we introduce some basic concepts in elliptic curves. For more details, one can refer to [15, 20] . Definition 2.1. Let q = p α , where p is a prime number and α is a positive integer. An elliptic curve E over the finite field F q is a non-singular projective plane curve defined by the equation
In characteristic p ̸ = 2, 3, this equation can be reduced to the short form
Moreover, the set of F q -rational points of E is defined as
where O is the point at infinity.
The set E(F q ) forms an abelian additive group with O as the trivial element. For a point P ∈ E(F q ), the order of P is the least positive integer n such that nP = O and it is denoted by ord(P ).
In the following, we consider maps between elliptic curves that preserve the algebraic structure of the group of points of elliptic curves. [18] .
For every subgroup G of E 1 , there exists an elliptic curve E 2 (unique up to isomorphism) and an isogeny ψ : E 1 −→ E 2 with kernel G. This isogeny can be computed using Velu's formula or using kernel polynomial of the subgroup G [11] .
The group of all isogenies from E 1 to E 2 is denoted by Hom(E 1 , E 2 ) and End(E) =
Hom(E, E) denotes the endomorphism ring of the curve E.
According to During's theorem [8] , End(E) is either an order in an imaginary quadratic field or an order in a quaternion algebra over Q. An elliptic curve E is called ordinary in the first case and supersingular in the second case. supersingular elliptic curves are an important family of elliptic curves in isogeny-based quantum cryptography due to the hardness of finding an isogeny between given supersingular curves. The most well-known family of these curves are as follows:
In the following, we consider the notion of Weil pairing on elliptic curves. Let
. The Weil pairing e r is a map
with the following properties [15] :
e r (P, P ) = 1
There is an efficient algorithm to compute e r (P, Q) for every P, Q ∈ E[r].
(4) For the isogeny ϕ :
we have e r (P, ϕ(Q)) = e r (ϕ(P ), Q).
Certificateless Identification Scheme
In this section, we briefly present the structure of Certificateless Identification scheme (CLI), first introduced by Chin et al. in [6] and then we review the CLI scheme proposed in [6] on elliptic curves to see an example (ECLI).
3.0.1. Framework of certificateless identification scheme. Certificateless Identification scheme, includes six basic algorithms as follows:
Setup The KGC executes the Setup algorithm. The input of this algorithm is the security parameter 1 k and the output is the master secret key msk and master public key mpk. The KGC keeps secret msk and publishes mpk.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract
The KGC runs this algorithm. The KGC takes the user's identity ID as input and generates partial private key ppk ID . Then he sends the generated ppk ID securely to the user.
Set-User-Key
This algorithm is done by the user. It takes in the security parameter 1 k and the user's identity ID as input and generates user's secret value sv ID and its corresponding public key upk ID .
Set-Private-Key
The user runs this algorithm. Using identity ID, public key upk ID , the secret value sv ID and partial private key ppk ID , the algorithm returns the user's secret key usk.
Identification-Protocol: This protocol consists of two algorithms Prover and
Verifier. It is a challenge-response interaction between prover and verifier to confirm the user's identity. Both algorithms take the values of upk ID , mpk and prover's identity ID as input. The prover takes also usk as the user's private key and starts to perform the protocol as follows:
1) Prover sends the commitment to the Verifier.
2) Verifier sends the a value as the challenge to the Prover.
3) Prover sends the response to the Verifier and verifier will confirm the prover's identity if he could pass the verification test successfully.
3.1. ECLI Scheme. In [6] , Chin et al. provide an efficient pairing-free CLI scheme which is also free from the key escrow and certificate management problem. In the following, we represent this scheme on the additive group of points of an elliptic curve over a finite field.
For security parameter k and finite field F q , define an elliptic curve E over F q and for the random element a ∈ Z * q , set P KGC = aP .
Select two hash functions H
Publish the master public key mpk = {E, q, H 1 , H 2 , P KGC , P } and keep the master secret key msk = a.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract(mpk, msk, ID)
1. Select a random element x ∈ Z * q and compute X = xP , 2. Compute α = H 1 (ID, P KGC , X), 1. Prover selects a random r ∈ Z * q and compute R = rP . 2. Prover also computes X = s ID P + αP KGC + βQ and sends X, R to Verifier.
3. Verifier selects a random c ∈ Z * q and sends c to Prover. 4. Prover Computes response y = r + cs ID and sends y to Verifier.
Verifier accepts if and only if yP
where α = H 1 (ID, P KGC , X) and β = H 2 (ID, P KGC , X, Q).
To prove correctness, one can show that
Our New Scheme
In this section, we introduce our certificateless scheme using isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves. The security of this scheme is based on the problem of finding isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves which is quantum-resistant [9] and some pairing problems. Then we generalize the proposed scheme such that the verifier can verify more than one identity by a single execution of the protocol.
Setup
it selects a point P ∈ E 2 and sets P KGC = ϕ(P ) ∈ E 1 .
It selects a hash function H
4. It publishes the master public key mpk = {q, E 1 , E 2 , H, P KGC , P } and keeps the master secret key msk = G. 
Partial-Private-Key-Extract

It computes S ID = ϕ(Q ID
).
It returns the partial private key ppk = (S ID , n).
Set-User-Key (1 k ) 1. User selects a random b ∈ Z n , P ′ ∈ E 2 [n] and sets the user's secret value
Set-Private-Key (mpk, ppk, s ID , U pk , ID) 1. User checks e 2 (P, S ID ) = e 1 (P KGC , Q ID ) where
If correct, then he selects a point P ′ randomly and computes an isogeny
3. He computes U pk = ψ(bP ). Then publishes U pk and the Weil pairing e 3 :
4. He sets U sk = bS ID + P ′ .
Identification-Protocol:
Prover (mpk, ID, U sk ) and Verifier (mpk, ID, U pk , P KGC )
1. Prover selects a random point R ∈ E 3 .
Prover computes the commitment S = R + ψ(S ID ) and sends (S, E 3 , n) to
Verifier. Proof. We prove that a legitimate user can be verified by an honest verifier as follows.
Verifier checks if
To prove the soundness property, we show that forging the user's identity at least twice implies that the cheater has some parts of the user's secret key or is able to compute them. 
To verify the private keys, the user checks if e 2 (P,S ID ) = e 1 (P KGC ,Q ID ). This equality holds because e 2 (P,S ID ) = e 2 (P,
In the identification step, the prover selects R ∈ E 3 and sends S = R + ψ(S ID ) to verifier. By receiving the value d ∈ F q from the verifier, user sends the response
and W = e 2 (P, U sk ) to verifier. Then verifier checks if
Efficiency and Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the complexity and security of our proposed identification scheme and then we review the reset attack and its effect on our protocol.
In the following, we consider the required tools and their computational complexity to execute each step of our protocol and then we summarize the total number of needed operations in Table 5 . One of the essential requirements of implementing the proposed protocol is constructing an isogeny when its kernel is available. As we see in the scheme, KGC needs to construct the isogeny ϕ and the user needs to construct the isogeny ψ in the Setup and Set-PrivateKey algorithms respectively. The following procedure shows that how we can construct such isogenies in general.
Let E be an elliptic curve. Then for each subgroup G of E with |G| = ℓ, there exists an isogeny ϕ : E → E ′ = E/G (unique up to isomorphism) with ker(ϕ) = G. In order to find such an isogeny, one can use the Velu's formula with the running time O(ℓ) [19] . Moreover, in the case where |G| = ℓ e and ℓ is a small prime, one can use the Jao's efficient proposition [9] to compute ϕ as follows. Set E 0 = E, G 0 = G and compute
We also need to compute dual of isogenies during the execution of the protocol. Since
, one can compute the dual isogeny ϕ of an l-isogeny ϕ using the Velu's formula.
We also need to compute some pairings during the execution of the protocol. Miller's algorithm efficiently computes the pairing of two points of order n in O(log n) operations [15] .
The following table shows the required operations to execute each step of the proposed protocol. We omit the field operations and also the addition of points on an elliptic curve due to their negligible complexity compared to other operations. The required operations consist of scalar Multiplication (M), Pairing (P), Hashing (H), Isogeny (I) and its Evaluation (E) computations. Table 1 . Operation costs for our protocol One can use the following parameter selection to have a more efficient setting. Assume that KGC selects a finite field F q where q = p 2k and a supersingular elliptic curve E 1 over F q . Then by [21] we have:
Let P 1 and P 2 be two generators of E 1 with orders n 1 and n 2 respectively. KGC selects a point G ∈ E 1 of prime order ℓ and computes an isogeny ϕ :
, where ℓ ′ is the inverse of ℓ in Z/n 1 Z, we have
Finally, we can choose H : {0, 1} * → Z n 2 and set Q ID = H(ID)P 2 to avoid trivial pairing evaluations.
Besides some pairing problems, the security of our protocol is based on the hardness of isogeny problem:
Isogeny Problem: Let E 1 and E 2 be two isogenous elliptic curves. Find an isogeny ϕ :
There have been many efforts to attack the isogeny problem in the literature. In 2013, Galbraith and Stolbunov introduced an algorithm which solves the isogeny problem for ordinary curves over finite field F q in O(q 1/4 ), where O denotes the complexity with the logarithmic factors omitted [10] . For supersingular elliptic curves, one can use Delfs and Galbraith's classical algorithm which solves the isogeny problem in O(p 1/2 ) operations, where p is the characteristic of the base field [7] .
In quantum computing, there exists a subexponential quantum algorithm that breaks the isogeny problem for ordinary elliptic curves using the commutativity of the endomorphism rings of these curves. In contrast, supersingular curves are secure against this attack due to the non-commutative property of their corresponding endomorphism ring. As the best-known quantum algorithm for attacking to supersingular elliptic curves is proposed by Biasse et al.
[3] which solves the isogeny problem with exponential running time O(p 1/4 ), supersingular elliptic curves seem to be promising candidates for post-quantum cryptography.
Finally, we consider reset attack in which the cheating verifier can reset the internal state of the prover to obtain some secret information. Therefore, according to the protocol, it is sufficient that the prover P selects R randomly in commitment stage to prevent this attack.
EXAMPLE
In this section, we present an example of the implementation of the scheme for a 180-bit finite field. This example is executed by the SAGE software [16, 17] . The example goes as follows:
Setup p = 4900152601274334517835467129341032968169,
, E 1 : y 2 = x 3 + 1 over F q , P 1 = (P 1,x , P 1,y ), P 1,x = 493486036157905657964275161469431052712a + 4373798459541278086528298420579973616663 P 1,y = 1285585884598696151376065867691109571658a + 2392740759296656698266437734244539533444. P 2 = (P 2,x , P 2,y ), P 2,x = 127545497348463939370225975223280635163a + 2880970568367509996627679914344958289175 P 2,y = 452307022754806384688018960174800910223a + 632568880073957301817719655232813442491. P KGC = (P KGC,x , P KGC,y ) ∈ E 1 P KGC,x = 1597150371384737957075228145436152164013a + 3901015952850292137453702860614393037116, P KGC,y = 2368147936020029785109966438569409460906a + 2219176816233816956493453070298402130467. U pk = (U pk,x , U pk,y ), Verifier: e 2 (P, Y ) = e 3 (U pk , S)e 1 (P KGC , Q ID ) d = c 2 , c 2 = 4347231376226473047864170783550883335023a + 3532987354122379343126022866043410543965.
